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ABSTRACT
In this paper we formulate and solve a distributed binary
hypothesis-testing problem. We consider a cooperative team that consists
of two decision makers (DM's); one is refered to as the primary DM and the
other as the consulting DM. The team objective is to carry out binary
hypothesis testing based upon uncertain measurements. The primary DM
can declare his decision based only on its own measurements; however, in
ambiguous situations the primary DM can ask the consulting DM for an
opinion and it incurs a communications cost. Then the consulting DM
transmits either a definite recommendation or pleads ignorance. The
primary DM has the responsibility of making a final definitive decision.
The team objective is the minimization of the probability of error, taking
into account different costs for hypothesis misclassification and
communication costs. Numerical results are included to demonstrate the
dependence of the different decision thresholds on the problem
parameters, including different perceptions of the prior information.
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21. Introduction and Motivation.
In this paper we formulate, solve, and analyze a distributed hypothesis-
testing problem which is an abstraction of a wide class of team decision
problems. It represents a normative version of the "second-opinion"
problem in which a Dormary decision maker (DM) has the option of
soliciting, at a cost, the opinion of a consulting DM when faced with an
ambiguous interpretation of uncertain evidence.
1.1 Motivating.Examples.
Our major motivation for this research is provided by generic hypothesis-
testing problems in the field of Command and Control. To be specific,
consider the problem of target detection formalized as a binary hypothesis
testing problem ( Ho means no target, while H1 denotes the presense of a
target ). Suppose that independent noisy measurements are obtained by
two geographically distributed sensors (Figure 1). One sensor, the primary
DM, has final responsibility for declaring the presense or absence of a
target, with different costs associated with the probability of false alarm
versus the probability of missed detection. If the primary DM relied only
on the measurements of his own sensor, then we have a classical
centralized detection problem that has been extensively analyzed; see, for
example, Van Trees [1]. if the actual measurements of the second sensor
were communicated to the primary DM, we nave once more a classical
centralized detection problem in which we have two independent
measurements on the same hypothesis; in this case, we require
communication of raw data and this is expensive both from a channel
bandwidth point of view and, perhaps more importantly, because radio or
acoustic communication can be intercepted by the enemy.
Continuing with the target detection problem, we can arrive at the model
that we shall use in the sequel by making the following assumptions which
model the desire to communicate as little as possible. The primary DM can
look at the data from his own sensor and attempt to arrive at a decision
using a likelihood-ratio test (Irt), which yields a threshold test in the
linear-Gaussian case. Quite often the primary DM can be confident about
the quality of his decision. However, we can Imagine that there will be
instances that the data will be close to the decision threshold,
corresponding to an ambiguous situation for the primary DM. In such cases
it may pay off to Incur a communications cost and seek some information
from the other available sensor. It remains to establish what is the nature
of the Information to be transmitted back to the primary DM.
3In our model, we assume the existence of a consulting DM having access to
the data from the other sensor. We assume that the consulting DM has the
ability to map the raw data from his sensor Into decisions. The consulting
DM is "activated" only at the request of the primary DM. It is natural to
speculate that its advise will be ternary in nature: YES, I think there is a
target; NO, I do not think there is a target; and, SORRY, NOT SURE MYSELF.
Note that these transmitted decisions in general require less bits than the
raw sensor data, hence the communication is cheap and more likely to
escape enemy interception. Then, the primary DM based upon the message
received from the consulting DM has the responsibility of making the final
binary team decision on whether the target is present or absent.
The need for communicating with small-bit messages can be appreciated
if we think of detecting an enemy submarine using passive sonar(Figure 2).
We associate the primary DM with an attack submarine, and the consulting
DM with a surface destroyer. Both have towed-array sonar capable of
long-range enemy submarine detection. Request for information from the
submarine to the destroyer can be initiated by having the sub eject a slot-
buoy with a prerecorded low-power radio message. A short active sonar
pulse can be used to transmit the recommendation from the destroyer to
the submarine. Thus, the submarine has the choice of obtaining a "second
opinion" with minimal compromise of its covert mission.
Of course, target detection is only an example of more general binary
hypothesis-testing problems. Hence, one can readily extend the basic
distributed team decision problem setup to other situations. For example,
in the area of medical diagnosis we imagine a primary physician
interpreting the outcomes of several tests. In case of doubt, he sends the
patient to another consulting physician for other tests ( at a dollar cost ),
and seeks his recommendation. However, the primary physician has the
final diagnostic responsibility. Similar scenarios occur in the intelligence
field where the "compartmentalization" of sensitive data, or the
protection of a spy, dictate infrequent and low-bit communications. In
more general military Command and Control problems, we seek insight on
formalizing the need to break EMCON, and at what cost, to resolve tactical
situation assessment ambiguities.
1.2 Literature Review.
The solution of distributed decision problems is quite a bit different, and
much more difficult, as compared to their centralized counterparts. Indeed
4there is only a handful of papers that deal with solutions to distributed
hypothesis-testing problems. The first attempt to illustrate the
difficulties of dealing with distributed hypothesis-testing problems was
published by Tenney and Sandell [21; they point out that the decision
thresholds are in general coupled. Ekchian [31 and Ekchian and Tenney [41
deal with detection networks in which downstream DM's make decisions
based upon their local measurements and upstream DM decisions. Kushner
and Pacut [51 Introduced a delay cost ( somewhat similar to the
communications cost in our model ) in the case that the observations have
exponential distributions, and performed a simulation study. Recently,
Chair and Varshney [61 have pointed out how the results in [21 can be
extended in more general settings. Boettcher [7] and Boettcher and Tenney
[8], [9], have shown how to modify the normative solutions in [41 to reflect
human limitation constraints, and arrive in at normative/descriptive
model that captures the constraints of human implementation in the
presense of decision deadlines and increasing human workload;
experiments using human subjects showed close agreement with the
predictions of their normative/descriptive model. Finally, Tsitsiklis 110]
and Tsitsiklis and Athans [111 demonstrate that such distributed
hypothesis-testing problems are NP-complete; their research provides
theoretical evidence regarding the inherent complexity of solving optimal
distributed decision problems as compared to their centralized
counterparts ( which are trivially solvable ).
1.3 Contributions of this Research.
The main contribution of this paper relates to the formulation and optimal
solution of the team decision problem described above. Under the
assumption that the measurements are conditionally independent, we show
that the optimal decision rules for both the primary and the consulting DM
are deterministic and are expressed as likelihood-ratio tests with
constant thresholds which are tightly coupled (see Section 3 and the
Appendix ).
When we specialize the general results to the case that the observations
are linear and the statistics are Gaussian, then we are able to derive
explicit expressions for the decision thresholds for both the primary and
consulting DM's ( see Section 4 ). These threshold equations are tightly
coupled, thereby necessitating an iterative solution. They provide
clear-cut evidence that the DM's indeed operate as team members; their
optimal thresholds are very different from those that they would use in
isolation, i.e. in a non-team setting. This, of course, was the case in other
versions of the distributed hypothesis-testing problem, e.g. [2].
5The numerical sensitivity results ( summarized in Section 5 ) for the
linear-Gaussian case provide much needed intuitive understanding of the
problem and concrete evidence that the team members operate in a
more-or-less intuitive manner, especially after the fact. We study the
impact of changing the communications cost and the measurement
accuracy of each DM upon the decision thresholds and the overall team
performance. In this manner we can obtain valuable insight on the optimal
communication frequency between the DM's. As to be expected, as the
communication cost increases, the frequency of communication (and
asking for a second opinion) decreases, and the team performance
approaches that of the primary DM operating in isolation. In addition, we
compare the overall distributed team performance to the centralized
version of the problem in which the primary DM had access, at no cost, to
both sets of observations. In this manner, we can study the degree of
inherent performance degradation to be expected as a consequence of
enforcing the distributed decision architecture in the overall decision
making process.
Finally, we study the team performance degradation when one of the team
members, either the primary or the consulting DM, has an erroneous
estimate of the hypotheses prior probabilities. This corresponds to mildly
different mental models of the prior situation assesment; see Athans [121.
As expected the team performance is much more sensitive to
misperceptions by the primary DM as compared to similar misperceptions
by the consulting DM. This implies that, if team training reduces
misperceptions on the part of the DM's, the greatest payoff is obtained in
training the primary DM.
2. Problem Definition
The problem is one of hypothesis testing. The team has to choose
among two alternative hypotheses Ho and H1, with a priori probabilities
P(H )=pCo P(H )=Pa (1)
Each of two DM's, one called primary (DM A) and one consulting (DM B),
receives an uncertain measurement ty and yIp respectively (Figure 1),
distributed with known joint probability density functions
6P(y,,yo I Hi) ; i 0,1. (2)
The final decision of the team ur (0 or 1, indicating Ho or H1 to be
true) is the responsibility of the primary DM. DM A initially makes a
preliminary decision u, where it can either decide (O or 1) on the basis of
its own data (ie y!), or at a cost (C>O) can solicit DM B's opinion (u==I),
prior to making the commital decision.
The consulting DM's decision up consists of three distinct messages
(call them :x,v and z) and is activated only when asked. We decided to
assign three messages to DM B, because we wanted to have one message
indicating each of the two hypotheses and one message Indicating that the
consulting DM is 'not sure.' In fact, we proved that the optimal content for
the messages of DM B is the one mentioned above.
When the message from DM B is received,the burden shifts back to
the primary DM, which Is called to make the commital decision of the team
based on his own data and the information from the consulting DM.
We now define the following cost function:
J: {0,1 )x{Ho,H1} - R (3)
with J(uf,H1) being the cost incurred by the team choosing uf, when l- is
true.
Then, the optimality criterion for the team is a function
J : {0, 1,I}xO, 1}x{Ho,H 1 -, R (4)
with:
J*(uuH.1 ): [ J(uf,Hi)+C u,,=I (information requested) (5)
J(uf,Hi) ; otherwise
The cost structure of the problem Is the usual cost structure used
in Hypothesis Testing problems, but also Includes the non-negative
communication cost, which the team incurs when the DM A decides to
obtain the consulting DM's Information.
Remark: According to the rules of the problem, when the preliminary
decision ua of the primary DM is 0 or 1, then the final team decision is 0 or
1 respectively (le P(uf=i I u,=l)= for =0,1 ).
7The objective of the decision strategies will be to minimize the
expected cost incurred
min EIJ*(u.,uf,H)] (6)
where the minimization is over the decision rules of the two DMs. Note
that the decision rule of the consulting DM is implicitly included in the
cost function, through the final team decision uf (which is a function of
the decision of the consulting DM).
All the prior information is known to both DMs. The only information
they do not share is their observations. Each DM knows only its own
observation and, because of the conditional independence assumption,
nothing about the other DM's observation.
The problem can now be stated as follows:
Pror/,m: Given p, pl, the distributions P(y.yl I Hi) for 1=O,1 with !UEYa,
YEYB, and the cost function J*, find the decision rules u=,ul and uf as
functions
Yc Y + {o, 1,I) (7)
Y': es 4 X,V,z} )
end
yf: Y x {x,v,z)} {I, 1 (9)
(subject to: P(uf=i I u=il)= 1 for i=O, I), which minimize the expected cost.
NOTE : The centralized counterpart of the problem, where a single DM
receives both observations is a well known problem. The solution is
deterministic and given by a likelihood ratio test (Irt). That is:
Yc YU x Y- {J0,1} (10)
wi th
0 ; (y.,Yp) 2 t 1
I ; otherwise
where
A(y,yI) = I H=)P,]/ [P(y, (,y I H1)P1]
P(Ho I y,,yl)/ P(H1 I yS,yo) (12)
and t is a precomputed threshold
t = [J(O,H1 )- J( 1,H)]/ [J( 1,Ho)- J(O,Ho)l (13)
provided J(1,Ho)> J(O,I) . Thus, the difficulty of our problem arises
because of its decentralized nature.
We will show that, under certain assumptions, the most restrictive
of which is conditional independence of the observations, the optimal
decision rules for the Prohbem are deterministic and given by Irt's with
constant thresholds. The thresholds of the two DMs are coupled, indicating
that the DMs work as a team rather than individuals.
3. About the Solution to the General Problem
In order to be able to solve the PrraL.em , we make the following
assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 1: J( 1,Ho)> J(O,Ho) ; J(O,H1 )> J(1,H,) (14)
or it is more costly for the team to err than to be correct.
This logical assumption is made in order to motivate the team members to
avoid erring and in order to enable us to algebraically put the optimal
decisions in lrt form.
ASSUMPTION 2: P(y, Iyti,H)= P(y, JIH) ; P(YI Iy,,HJ)= P(YI IH1 ) ; i=0, 1 (15)
or the observations y, and ye are conditionally independent.
This assumption removes the dependence of the one observation on the
other and thus allows us to write the optimal decision rules as lrt's with
constant thresholds.
9ASSUMPTION 3: Without loss of generality assume that:
P(ui=x lU,=IH o ) P(uo=Y lUM= oIH ) P(Up=z lu o_0)
P(U)=x lu.=I,H I) P(up=v lu.=I,H1) P(u =z IU,=I,H1)
This assumption is made in order to distinguish between the messages of
DM B.
As shown in detail in the Appendix, the optimal decision rules for
all three decisions of our problem (un, u, uf ) are given by deterministic
functions which are expressed as liko/ihood ratio teslt. with ctn'stant
thresholds. The three thresholds of the primary DM (two for up and one
for uf ) and the two thresholds of the consulting DM (for up ) can not be
obtained in closed form. They are coupled, that is the thresholds of one DM
are given as functions of the thresholds of the other DM.
Another important result is that, when the optimal decision rules
are employed and the consulting DM's decision Is x (or z), then the optimal
final decision rule of the primary DM is always 0 (or 1):
P(uf=O I Ua1I,U=X,y.)= I for all yE (y. I P(u.=I I Y)= 1, y.E Y.} (17)
and
P(uf-1 1 ut=I,u0=Z,y.)= 1 for all y.E {y. I P(U.=I I Y.)= 1, yE YE (18)
Thus, we can simplify our notation by changing the DM B decisions from x
to 0, from z to 1 and from v to ? (which is Interpreted as :"1 am not sure").
The team's decision process can be now described as follows : Each of the
two DMs receives an observation. Then, the primary DM can either make the
final decision (O or 1) or can decide to incur the communication cost
(ua=I) and pass the responsibility of the final decision to the consulting
DM. When called upon, the consulting DM can either make the final decision
or shift the burden back to DM A (up=?), in which case the primary DM is
forced to make the final decision, based on its own observation (y.) and
the fact that DM 8 decided up=?.
A detailed presentation of the facts discussed above can be found In
the Appendix.
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4. A Gaussian Example
We now present detailed threshold equations for the case where the
probability distributions of the two observations are Gaussian. We
selected the Gaussian distribution, despite its cumbersome algebraic
formulae, because of its generality. Our objective is to perform numerical
sensitivity analysis to the solution of this example, in order to gain
information on the team 'activities.'
We assume that the observations are distributed with the following
Gaussian distributions:
a - N(I,oq2) ; Yl - N(,o 2 ) (19)
The two alternative hypotheses are:
Ho': V=o or H1 :'l=1. (20)
Without loss of generality, assume that:
RO < Ri (21)
The rest of the notation is the same as in the general problem
described above.
We can show that the optimum decision rules for this example are
given by thresholds on the obseryvatt/on axes, as shown in Figure 3. Before
presenting the equations of the thresholds, we define some variables.
a. 1: lower threshold of DM A ' U : upper threshold of DM A
Yf.: threshold for the final decision of DM A
Fu.: lower threshold of DM B F1u : upper threshold of DM B
TJ 
(PiJ(lk) (2X)-05 exp(-0.5 x2) dx for i=a,p ; j=l,f,u ; k=O,1
-00
Note that the above function is the well-known error function, presented
with notational modifications to fit the purposes of the problem.
W1= 0.5 [u(o)- u(1 )] (22)
W2. (23)
w 3 l(D)Jl)_-r"( ..... (.. (24)) (0) U (1 o)_¢ (1 )
W 4 : 0.5 [DpU(O0)-piU()1J (25)
1*': =(%+!)/2 + [oa2/(I-h)fl ln[(p/(l-p)l] (26)
*: = (h+1 )/2 + [ac2 /(P -lo) ln[po/(l-p 0)l (27)
In (26) and (27), the (centralized) maximum likelihood estimators for each
DM are defined.
COROLLARY 1 : If P(u,=I)>O (i.e. information Is requested for some y,)
and if P(u P? I u,=I)>O (i.e. "I am not sure" is returned for some y,, when
information is requested), then the optimal final decision rule of the
primary DM is a deterministic function defined by:
Yf(Yr) 0 if Ym < va, (28)
1 if Y. > ¥f
where:
vcc+ a Iln( H) () ) (29)
COROLLARY 2 : If P(uc=I)>O (i.e. information is requested for some ya)
and the primary DM's final decision rule is the one given by Corollary 1,
then the optimal decision rule of the consulting DM is a deterministic
function defined by:
0 if YII 
y(Yg) =( ? if YVi <y1 u (30)
1 if tu (go
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where:
1_ minCie* In( 0(°)-f())o a2 n( 4 0U(o)-1((O)) (31)
R1 -Ro (PaU(0 )-(Pf(t) -hl Ppo I )(1)qa(1)
and:
u max [A*+ a In( 0aU(0 )-eal(o) ) 2 (of()-1a(0)) (32)
RILo aU(1)- t(1) ~1-I0R o Of( )-T)M()
COROLLARY 3: Given that the final decision rule employed by the
primary DM is the one of Corollary 1 and that the decision rule employed
by the consulting DM is the one of Corollary 2, then the optimal decision
rule for the preliminary decision ua of the primary DM is a deterministic
function defined by :
0 If yfa 'a
Ya(Y) [I if V1 (<y <. VU (33)
1 if ¥Vau <yU
where:
a"ln ( Oct) ; OiC <min {W, W2}
R1 -IZO 1-op1(1 )-C
=;t Vua*+-In uo)+C W2< C I W4 (34)
RI -Po 1-tU(1)-C
* Ya; otherwise
and:
aa2 ( (o c ) - OC(min(w 3,W 4}
¥o:%........ ln( ~P(D )+C
ua := + ..... n(O ) ; W< C < W (35)
- ( otherwi)+se
VIM* otherwise
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REM1ARK : Observe that the equations of all the thresholds include (and
possibly reduce to) a "centralized' part (if*) indicating the relation of
our problem to its centralized counterpart.
5. NUMERICAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We now perform sensitivity analysis to the solution of the Gaussian
example. Our objective is to analyze the effects on the team performance
from varying the parameters of our problem, in order to obtain better
understanding of the decentralized team decision mechanism. We vary the
quality of the observations of each DM (the variance of each DM), the a
priori likelihood of the hypotheses and the communication cost. Finally, we
study the effects of different a priori knowledge for each DM.
We use the following 'minimum error' cost function:
0 ; uf=i
J(uf, Hi)=  (36)
1 ; us
We do not need to vary the cost function, because this would be
mathematically equivalent to varying the a priori probabilities of the two
hypotheses.
5.1 Effects of varying the Qualit4 of the observations of the Primary DM
Denote :
C1* = cost incured if the consulting DM makes the decision alone.
We distinguish two cases depending on the cost associated with the
information (le the of quality of information)
CASE 1: min(Po ,-P o) i C I*+C
As the variance of the primary DM increases, it becomes less costly for
the team to have the primary DM alweys decide the more likely hypothesis,
than request for information. This occurs because the observation of DM A
becomes increasingly worthless. Thus, the primary DM progressively
ignores its observation and in order to minimize cost has to choose
between "de facto" deciding the more likely hypothesis (and incuring cost
equal to the probability of the least likely hypothesis) or "de facto"
requesting for information (and thus incuring the communication cost plus
the cost of the consulting DM). In this case, the prior is less than the
latter and so the optimum decision of the primary DM, as its variance
tends to infinity is to always decide the more likely hypothesis (Figure 4,
Po= .8). Thus:
lim P(ua=I) O 0
O02 00o
Moreover, the percentage gain in cost achieved by the team of DMs,
relative to the cost Incured by a single DM obtaining a single observation,
assymptotically goes to 0, as the variance of the primary DM goes to
infinity (Figure 5, Po= .8).
An Interesting insight can be obtained from Figure 5 ( Po= .8). As the
variance of the primary DM increases the percentage Improvement in cost
(defined above) is initially increasing and then decreasing assymptotically
to zero. The reason for this is that for very small variances, the
observations of the primary DM are so good that it does not need the
Information of the consulting DM. As the variance increases, the primary
DM makes better use of the Information and so the percentage
Improvement increases. But, at a certain point as the quality of the
observations worsens, the primary DM finds less costly to start declaring
more often the more likely hypothesis (ie to bias its decision towards the
more likely hypothesis) than requesting for information, for reasons
mentioned above, and so the percentage improvement from then on
decreases.
CASE 2: min(Po ,1- P ) > C 1 + C
With reasoning similar to the above, we obtain that (Figure 4, Po- .5):
li m P(u%=I) - 1
a0 2 00
Moreover, the percentage improvement is strictly increasing (and keeps
Incresing to a precomptutable limit; Figure 5, Po= .5). This reinforces the
last point we made in (Case 1) above. Since in the present case it is
always less costly for the primary DM to request and use the Information
than to bias its decision towards the more likely hypothesis, the
percentage improvement curve does not exhibit the non-monotonic
behavior observed in (Case 1) above ( where Po= .8).
15
5.2 Effects of varying the auality of the observations of the
Consulting DM
As the variance of the consulting DM's observations increases, less
information is requested by the primary DM, that is the primary DM's upper
and lower thresholds move closer to each other (Figure 6). This is
something we expected, since information of lesser quality is less
profitable (more costly) to the team of DMs.
We should note here that the thresholds of a DM is an alternative way
of representing the probabilities of the DM's decisions, since the decision
regions are characterized by the thresholds. For example:
P(U=I) =J P(y, I H) P(H)
The thresholds of the consulting DM demonstrate some Interesting
points of the team behavior (Figure 7). For small values of the variance
they are very close together, as the quality of the observations is very
good and so the consulting DM is willing to make the final team decision.
As the variance increases, DM 8 becomes more willing to return u=? (i.e.
"1 am not sure") and let DM A make the final team decision. As the
variance continues to increase, the thresholds of the consulting DM
converge again. It might seem counter-intuitive, but there is a simple
explanation. The consulting DM recognizes that the primary DM, despite
knowing that the quality of the consulting DM's information is bad, is
willing to incur the communication cost to obtain the Information. This
indicates that the primary DM is 'confused', that is, the a posteriori
probabilities of the two hypotheses (given its observation) are very close
together. Hense, the consulting DM becomes more willing to make the final
decision. After a certain point (a 2-62.4) the primary DIM does find it
worthwhile to request for information at all.
REMARK : Note in Figure 7 that the thresholds of the consulting DM
converge to 1 which would have been the maximum likelihood threshold
had the a priori probabilities of the two hypotheses been equal. But, the a
priori probabilities nic the b consu/tin Mf Iir uses inJ jS c/l. lt//ans are
functions of the given a priori probabilities (ie Ip) and the fact that the
primary DM requested for information (ie P(u,=I I IH) ). In fact, the
consulting DM uses as its a priori probabilities its own estimates of the
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primary DM's a posteriori probabilities. That is:
PP(H o) P(u,=I I Ho )
H P(H) P(u,=l I H) (37)
From the above, we deduce that for large variances (o 2-62) the estimates,
of the consulting DM, for the a posteriori probabilities of the primary DM
are very close to .5, reenforcing our point about the primary DM "being
confused."
Finally, it is clear, that as the variance of the consulting DM
increases, the percentage gain in cost, achieved by the team of DMs,
decreases to 0, since the primary DM eventually makes all the decisions
alone (centralized).
5.3 Effects of varying the Communication Cost
Increasing the communication cost is very similar to increasing the
variance of the consulting DM, since in both cases the team 'gets less for
its money" (because the team has to incur an increased cost, either in the
form of an increased communication cost, or in the form of the final cost,
because of the worse performance of the consulting DM).
The thresholds of the primary DM, exhibit the same behavior as in 5.2
above (converging together at Cz.35). The thresholds of the consulting DM
(Figure 8) converge together for the same reasons as in 5.2 above. Of
course, the thresholds do not start together for small values of the
communication cost (as in 5.2), because low communication cost does not
imply ability for the consulting DM to make accurate decisions. In fact, for
small values of the communication cost, DM A is compelled to request for
information more often than what is really needed and so the consulting
DM returns more often u=? (ie "' am not sure") and lets DM A make the
team final decision.
Again It is clear that, as the communication cost increases, the
percentage gain achieved by the team of the DMs decreases to zero (as the
communication becomes more costly and less frequent, until we reach the
centralized case).
5.4 Effects of varyjng the a priorl robabilities of the hypotheses
This case does not present many interesting points. As expected, there is
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symmetry in the performance of the team around the line p,= 0.5 . The
closer Po is to 0.5 the more often information is requested by DM A
(Figure 9) and the more often "I am not sure" is returned by DM B (Figure
10). This is understandable, because the closerpo is to 0.5, the bigger the
a priori uncertainty. Consequently, the percentage improvement achieved
by the team of the DMs is monotonically increasing with po from 0 to 0.5
and monotonically decreasing from 0.5 to 1.
5.5 Effects of imoerfect a oriori information
CASE 1: Only the consulting DM knows the true po
From Figure 11, where the true po is 0.8, we deduce that our model Is
relatively robust. If the primary DM's erroneous po is anywhere between
0.7 and 0.9, performance of the team will be not more than 10% away
from the optimum.
CASE 2: Only the primary DM knows the true po
As we see in Figure 12, where the true Pa is 0.8, our model exhibits
remarkable robustness qualities. If the consulting DM's erroneous po is as
far out as 0.01, the performance of the team will not be further than 7%
away from the optimal. This can be explained by looking at the consulting
DM's thresholds as functions of po (Figure 13). We observe that for values
of pO between 0.01 and 0.99, the thresholds do not change by much. This
occurs because, as explained in detail in 5.2 above, the consulting DM
knows that the primary DM requests for information when its a posteriori
probabilities of the two hypotheses are roughly equal, which is the case
indeed. As already stated, the consulting DM uses as its a priori
probabilities its estimates of the a posteriori probabilities of the primary
DM. Therefore, the consulting DM's estimates of the primary DM's a
posterlori probabilities are good, besides the discrepancy in Po, and the
team's performance is not tampered by much.
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APPENDIX : Solution to the General Problem
ASSUMPTION 1: J( 1,HO)> J(O,Ho) ; J(O,H1)> J( 1,H ) (38)
or it is more costly for the team to err than to be correct.
This logical assumption is made in order to motivate the team members to
avoid erring and in order to enable us to put the optinal decisions in irt
form.
ASSUMPTION 2: P(yj Iyp,Hj)= P(ya IHj) ; P(ypj ly,Hi)= P(yp 1H1) ; 1=0,1 (39)
or the observations y, and yp are conditionally independent.
This assumption removes the dependence of the one observation on the
other and thus allows us, as we are about to show, to write the optimal
decision rules as lrt's with constant thresholds.
ASSUMPTION 3: Without loss of generality assume that:
P(u-=x I ut=I,Ho ) P(uo=v I ua=I,Ho) P(up=z I u.=I,Ho) (40)
P(uS=x I u,=I,H,) P(up=v I ut=I,Hl ) P(up=z I ux=I,H )
This assumption is made in order to be able to distinguish between the
messages of DM B.
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THEOREM 1: Given decision rules u and u, and that information is
requested by the primary DM for some yEYY (i.e. P(u,=I)>O ), then the
optimal final decision of the primary DM after the information has been
received, can be expressed as a deterministic function
yf: Y x {x,v,z}- (0, 1
which is defined as likelihood ratio tests:
0 If Ut=i and A.(ya) > a i
Yf (y,u) )= for i=x,v,z (41)1 ; otherwise
where:
Po P(Y. I Ho) 42)
_A~(y~) = (42)
Pi P(y I Hj)
and:
P(Uo=i I u,=I, H 1) [J(I, 1H, )-J(O,H )1]
P(U=i I u,=I, Ho ) [J(1,Ho)-J(O,Ho)I
Remark : (29) is the equation for the corresponding threshold of the
Gaussian example.
THEOREM 2 : Given the optimal decision rule uf (derived in Theorem 1),
a decision rule ua and that information is requested for some yeYd (i.e.
P(u ,=I)>O),the optimal decision rule of the consulting DM is a deterministic
function
y: YA - {xv,z)
defined as the following likelihood ratio tests:
x if A(Yl) - b and (yp) > b 2
(Y) = [ v If A(y) < b 1 and A.(yl)' b 3 (44)
z if A(yl) < b2 and -A(yl) < b3
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where:
Po P(Yl I Ho)
(y,) P- (45)
PI P(Y I Hj)
and:
P(U=II H 1) g.P(uf u,=I,up-v,H )- P(uf I U=I,Upix,H1 )IJ(uf,HI)
b P(u =I I Ho) [P(Uf I u,=I,uP=X,Ho)
-
P(uf I iUl=V,)](uf,o (46)
P(ua=I I HI) )[P(uf I U=I,U--z,HI )- P(uf I um=I,UlpX,H1 )]J(uf,H )
b2 = (4)P(ut-II Ho ) 2[P(uf I U=I,up=X,Ho)- P(uf I Ua=I,uP=z,Ho)]J(uf,Ho)
U1
P(u=I I H ) .[P(Uf I U.=I,Up=Z,Hl)- P(uf U,=I,Up=V,H)]J(uf,Hl )
P(ua=II Ho) .[P(uf I U.=I,UP=v,Ho)- P(uf I U=I,U=z,Ho)]J(uf,Ho)
Equivalently, we can write:
x If nA(y) > 1
Y(Y)= V If A(y~) <f1 and A(y) > 32 (49)
z if ((Yl) < 02
where:
p1 = max bl, b2}) (50)
and:
02 = min { b2, b3}. (51)
Remark : (31) and (32) are the equations of the corresponding thresholds
of the Gaussian example.
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LEMMA 1 : Given the decision rule ut of the consulting DM and the
final decision rule uf of the primary DM, the preliminary decision rule u
of the primary DM can be expressed as a deterministic function
YaC: Y-+ {O,1,I}
defined as the following degenerate (because the thresholds are
functions of y.) irts:
0 if A(Y) >a I and A ) (y)2a 2
Ya(Y) ={[ I if AA(y) < a2 and 1/A(y) < 1/a3 (52)
1 if A.(ya) < a1 and 1/A(yd) 2 1/a3
where A~(!y) is defined in (42) and :
J(O,H1 ) - J(1,H 1)
a1 - (53)J( 1 ,Ho) - J(O,Ho)
P(Uf I ua=I,UP,ya) P(ul I u=I,H1 )[J(uf,H1) + CI - J(O,H1 )
Uf.-uA , ~~~~~~~~~(54)
= J(O,Ho) -- P(uf I u:=I,up,y) P(U I u,=I.Ho)[J(uf,Ho ) + C]
Uf, Ul
> P(uf I u.=I,Ul~,y,) P(ut I u.=I,H1)[J(uf,Hl ) + C1 - J( 1,H1)
UfA - -(55)
a3 =J(1,Ho) - . P(uf I u,=I,ui,ya) P(u I u=I.,Ho)[J(uf Ho) + C1
We proceed to show that the thresholds derived above
are indepeBndcen of ya.
COROLLARY 1 : If for some yx information is requested, according to
the rule of Lemma 1 and ul=x (or z) is returned, then the optimal final
decision uf of the primary DM is elways 0 (or 1); that is:
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P(uf=O I ul =I,ug=x,y) = 1 for all YaE Y {Y I P(u,=! I y|)= 1, yaE Y,} (56)
and
P(uf= l I uM=I,uA=Z,y.) 1 for all yae {ya I P(u,=I I ya)= 1, yE Ya} (57)
Remark: From Corrolary 1 we can now give another interpretation to the
team procedure: the primary DM can decide 0 or 1 using his own
observation or can decide,because of uncertainty, to incur the
communication cost (C) and shift the burden of the decision to the
consulting DM. Then it is the consulting DM's turn to choose between
deciding 0 or 1, or, because of uncertainty, shifting the burden back (at no
cost) to the primary DM, which is required to make the final decision
given his observation and the fact that the consulting DM's observation is
not good enough for the consulting DM to make the final decision.
According to the above, we can simplify our notation of the
consulting DM's messages by changing x to O, z to 1 and v to ?
(which is interpreted as the consulting DM saying "I am not sure").
Define the following secondary variables:
&aJO = J(1,Ho) - J(O,Ho) (58)
AJ1 = J(O,H1 ) - J(1,H, ) (59)
WI = AJO AJ [P(u= 1 I H) - PS=u1 I Ho)l (60)
AJ2Az 1[P(u=? I Ho)P(u= 1 I H1) - P(u=? I H )P(u= 1 I Ho)] (61)
AJo P(u,=? I H0) + AJ P(u,=? I H1)
AJO A J1 P(uR=? I H1)P(u,=O I Ho) - P(u=? I H)Pu=O I H ) (62)W3 = (62)
AJo P(up=? I Ho ) + aJl P(up=? I H1)
JoW4 = AJ1 [P(u=O I Ho)- P(u=O I H)(63)
24
P(u= I I HI) J1 - C
a2,1 = .. (64)P(up= 1 I Ho) i + C
[P(u= 1 I H1) + P(up_? I H) AJ - C(65)
[P(uo=1 I H) + P(ue=? I H)] Jo + C
P(up=O I H) AJ1 + C
a3,1 = (66)P(up=O I HO,) JO - C
[P(uo=O I Ht)+P(uo-? I H )] J + C (67)
[P(uio I Ho)+P(up=? I Ho)l Jo - C
THEOREI 3 : Given the optimum final decision rule uf of the primary
DM (derlved in Theorem 1) and the optimum decision rule us of the
consulting DM, the optimum decision rule for the preliminary decision of
the primary DM is given by a deterministic function
YU : Ya.-+ {0,1,I}
defined by the following likelihood ratio tests:
0 if >(y) .>c1
= I if Ac(ya)<al and A(y.)?a 2 (68)
1 if A,(Y.) < ( 2
where:
a2,1 if 0 < C < min {W1,W2}
Zt I 82,2 if W2 < Cs W 4 (69)
a1 otherwise
3,1 if 0 I C I min {W3,W 4}
2 = 3, a,2 if W3 < C s W l (70)
a1 otherwise
Remark' (34) and (35) are the equations of the corresponding thresholds
for the Gaussian example.
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